The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics: Volume 1.pdf
More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies. The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.
Roger D. Blair is Walter J. Matherly Professor, Department of Economics at the University of Florida where he has taught for 40 years. His research interests center on antitrust economics and policy. In addition to numerous articles in economics journals and law reviews, he has published Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control, Antitrust Economics, Monopsony in Law and Economics, and Antitrust Law, Volume II with Areeda and Hovenkamp. Dr. Blair has also served as an expert witness in over 50 cases.
INTRODUCTION AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ; 1. Rationales for Antitrust: Economics and Other Bases ; Daniel A. Crane ; 2. Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences ; Keith N. Hylton ; 3. Economic Analysis of Antitrust Exemptions ; Peter Carstensen ; 4. Healthcare Provider and Payer Markets ; Cory S. Capps and David Dranove ; 5. International Antitrust Institutions ; Oliver Budzinski ; 6. Competition Policy in Public Choice Perspective ; Fred S. McChesney, Michael Reksulak, and William F. Shughart II ; 7. Antitrust Settlements ; Daniel L. Rubinfeld ; 8. The Economics of Antitrust Class Actions ; Roger D. Blair and Christine Piette Durrance ; 9. Behavioral Economics and Antitrust ; Mark Armstrong and Steffen Huck ; 10. Experimental Economics in Antitrust ; Wieland Muller and Hans-Theo Normann ; 11. Optimal Antitrust Remedies: A Synthesis ; William H. Page ; 12. Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States and the European Union: Standing and Antitrust Injury ; Jeffrey L. Harrison ; 13. Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process ; Aaron Edlin and Joseph Farrell ; II. MONOPOLY: STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS ; 14. Monopoly and Dominant Firms: Antitrust Economics and Policy Approaches ; Lawrence J. White ; 15. Market Definition ; Louis Kaplow ; 16. Bilateral Monopoly: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Policy ; Roger D. Blair and Christina DePasquale ; 17. Antitrust and the Economics of Networks ; Daniel F. Spulber and Christopher S. Yoo ; 18. The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses ; David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee ; III. MERGERS ; 19. Efficiency Claims and Antitrust Enforcement ; Howard Shelanski ; 20. Unilateral Effects ; Bryan Keating and Robert D. Willig ; 21. Coordinated Effects: Evolution of Practice and Theory ; Jith Jayaratne and Janusz Ordover ; 22. Buyer Power in Merger Review ; Dennis W. Carlton, Mary Coleman, and Mark Israel ; 23. Vertical Mergers ; Michael A. Salinger