The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics: Volume 2.pdf
More than any other area of regulation, antitrust economics shapes law and policy in the United States, the Americas, Europe, and Asia. In a number of different areas of antitrust, advances in theory and empirical work have caused a fundamental reevaluation and shift of some of the assumptions behind antitrust policy. This reevaluation has profound implications for the future of the field. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics has collected chapters from many of the leading figures in antitrust. In doing so, this two volume Handbook provides an important reference guide for scholars, teachers, and practitioners. However, it is more than a merely reference guide. Rather, it has a number of different goals. First, it takes stock of the current state of scholarship across a number of different antitrust topics. In doing so, it relies primarily upon the economics scholarship. In some situations, though, there is also coverage of legal scholarship, case law developments, and legal policies. The second goal of the Handbook is to provide some ideas about future directions of antitrust scholarship and policy. Antitrust economics has evolved over the last 60 years. It has both shaped policy and been shaped by policy. The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics will serve as a policy and research guide of next steps to consider when shaping the future of the field of antitrust.
Roger D. Blair is Walter J. Matherly Professor, Department of Economics at the University of Florida where he has taught for 40 years. His research interests center on antitrust economics and policy. In addition to numerous articles in economics journals and law reviews, he has published Law and Economics of Vertical Integration and Control, Antitrust Economics, Monopsony in Law and Economics, and Antitrust Law, Volume II with Areeda and Hovenkamp. Dr. Blair has also served as an expert witness in over 50 cases.
I. MONOPOLIZATION: CONDUCT ; 1. A Framework for the Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct ; B. Douglas Bernheim and Randal Heeb ; 2. Predatory Pricing ; Kenneth G. Elzinga and David E. Mills ; 3. Raising Rivals' Costs ; David T. Scheffman and Richard S. Higgins ; 4. Predatory Buying ; John E. Lopatka ; 5. Competitive Discounts and Antitrust Policy ; Kevin M. Murphy, Edward A. Snyder, and Robert H. Topel ; 6. Squeezing Claims: Refusals to Deal, Essentials Facilities, and Price Squeezes ; Barak Orbach and Raphael Avraham ; 7. Innovation and Antitrust Policy ; Thomas F. Cotter ; 8. Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Article 102 TFEU in Contrast to 2 Sherman Act ; Pierre Larouche and Maarten Pieter Schinkel ; 9. Treatments of Monopolization in Japan and China ; Ping Lin and Hiroshi Ohashi ; 10. Monopolization in Developing Countries ; Alberto Heimler and Kirtikumar Mehta ; 11. Business Strategy and Antitrust Policy ; Michael J. Mazzeo and Ryan C. McDevitt ; II. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTRACTUAL EQUIVALENTS ; 12. Resale Price Maintenance of Online Retailing ; Benjamin Klein ; 13. Exclusive Dealing ; Howard Marvel ; 14. Tying Arrangements ; Erik Hovenkamp and Herbert Hovenkamp ; 15. Vertical Restraints Across Jurisdictions ; Ralph A. Winter and Edward M. Iacobucci ; 16. Franchising and Exclusive Distribution: Adaptation and Antitrust ; Francine Lafontaine and Margaret E. Slade ; III. COLLUSION AMONG OSTENSIBLE COMPETITORS ; 17. Cartels and Collusion: Economic Theory and Experimental Economics ; Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach ; 18. Cartels and Collusion: Empirical Evidence ; Margaret C. Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow ; 19. Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly ; Edward J. Green, Robert C. Marshall, and Leslie M. Marx ; 20. Auctions and Bid Rigging ; Ken Hendricks, R. Preston McAfee, and Michael A. Williams ; 21. Screening for Collusion as a Problem of Inference ; Michael J. Doane, Luke M. Froeb, David S. Sibley, and Brijesh P. Pinto ; 22. Competition Policy for Industry Standards ; Richard Gilbert ; 23. Antitrust Corporate Governance and Compliance ; Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz and D. Daniel Sokol